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Should we still build an empire?

Almost regardless of who wins the presidential nomination, there’s small likelihood of serious debate about the most crucial long-term foreign-policy question facing the American people: Do we or do we not want to maintain a global empire by force of arms? Or, to put it another way, what’s in it for us, as individual citizens, for the United States to maintain 800 military bases around the world? Does the word “superpower” actually mean anything in today’s world?

Hardly anybody in the foreign-policy establishment likes having it put that way. It strikes them as vulgar and reductive. Hence anybody who questions, for example, whether the United States really needs to spend almost twice as much on wars and weaponry as the rest of the world combined gets caricatured as a crackpot isolationist — the kind of person who, in the usual formulation, would have ignored Hitler’s military buildup in the 1930s.

Today, only marginal political figures like Ron Paul, Pat Buchanan and Ralph Nader devote themselves to such arcane topics. Indeed, one sometimes wonders whether the foreign-policy “experts” and “resident scholars” who decorate Washington think tanks wouldn’t fear more than anything else the diminishment of their own swollen self-regard should Americans return to the Founding Fathers’ views of enlightened national self-interest.

Jefferson may have put it best in his 1801 inaugural address, promising “peace, commerce and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none.”

No, Al Qaeda didn’t exist in 1801, although Barbary pirates did. That said, the time’s rapidly approaching when events outside U.S. control will force a serious re-examination of America’s place in a fast-changing world. To anybody with both eyes open, what the Bush administration’s ill-conceived “war on terror” has demonstrated is almost the precise opposite of what its 2003 “shock and awe” bombing campaign was intended to show: not overwhelming U.S. tactical strength, but all-too-obvious U.S. strategic weakness.

To the neoconservative imagineers who dreamed it up, the Iraq War was supposed to be the first step toward American domination of Asia, with the ultimate goal of containing China.

Debate “the surge” all you want. Five years, close to 4,000 dead Americans, hundreds of thousands of dead Iraqis, and close to a trillion dollars later, the United States remains tied down there like Gulliver in Lilliput. Its main strategic result has been to improve Iran’s position, theoretically our next opponent in an empire-building war that now appears blessedly unlikely to happen.

Meanwhile, the Persians are making multibillion-dollar gas- and oil-development deals with China, whose continued willingness to buy American securities basically finances U.S. deficit spending for the war.

Al Qaeda operates with increasing openness in remote tribal areas not controlled by Pakistan’s government. Meanwhile, scenes of desperate Palestinians streaming out of Gaza into Egypt couldn’t help but remind anybody not blinded by propaganda of the fall of the Berlin Wall. The barriers may be temporarily back in place, but the Bush/Likud policy of treating the area like an enormous outdoor prison camp is clearly doomed to fail.

Equally clear, however, is that the United States cannot dominate the world by force. We wouldn’t have enough troops to fight on all these fronts even if Americans had ever bought into the imperialist idea, which they never have. Our vaunted nuclear arsenal has become the economic equivalent of the Egyptian pyramids: fantastically expensive but useless. Maybe after Bush is gone, we can talk about it.

Arkansas Democrat-Gazette columnist Gene Lyons can be reached by e-mail at [email protected].

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