Iran a test of foreign policy
A fascinating theoretical debate is under way on the future of American foreign policy, but the urgent practical question is: What should we do about Iran’s nuclear program?
Even though Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is pursuing a diplomatic track to stop Iran from going nuclear, Bush’s liberal critics are demanding an even more generous (or “realistic”) stance: A U.S. offer of direct negotiations and a possible “grand bargain” including security guarantees. Right-wingers, for their part, advocate preparations for military strikes.
I come down thinking that Bush ought do it all vis-a-vis Iran: Unleash the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, to explore openings with Iran for a grand deal, while also keeping up the diplomatic drive for stiff economic sanctions and preparing to bomb (or let Israel bomb) if nothing else works.
The theoretical foreign policy debate was kicked off by columnist Charles Krauthammer in February 2004, in the last year of Bush’s first term, in a lecture at the American Enterprise Institute in which he advocated “democratic realism” as an alternative to Bush’s “democratic globalism” — specifically, promotion of democracy everywhere, but the use of American military force only where vital U.S. interests are at stake.
This year has produced a small avalanche of theoretical tracts, of which I’ve read three: Francis Fukuyama’s “America at the Crossroads,” the Progressive Policy Institute’s “With All Our Might” and “The Good Fight” by New Republic editor-at-large Peter Beinart.
Fukuyama and Krauthammer agree on next to nothing except a listing of the traditional schools of American foreign policy thinking: “isolationism” (now represented by the likes of Pat Buchanan), “realism” (the view of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and former President George H.W. Bush), “liberal internationalism” (the outlook of most Democrats) and “neo-conservativism” or “democratic globalism” (the first-term Bush policy).
Isolationists argue the United States should stay clear of foreign entanglements as much as possible. Realists favor intervention to secure U.S. interests, but not to do “social work.” Liberal internationalists, heirs to President Woodrow Wilson, advocate working through multilateral institutions to secure peace and foster development.
In his book, Fukuyama declares that Bush’s Iraq misadventure has discredited neo-conservatism, which he defines as a preference for force over diplomacy, a belief in American cultural superiority, unilateralist “arrogance” and advocacy of pre-emptive war.
He concludes that an alternative is necessary, and he calls it “realistic Wilsonianism,” emphasizing reliance less on military force and more on instruments of “soft power,” such as diplomacy, alliance-building, democracy promotion, economic aid and trade. This, he says, would rebuild American legitimacy, something that he doubts can be done without a change of administrations.
Much the same case is made by Beinart and by the editor of the PPI book, Will Marshall, both of whom also are doing battle with the Michael Moore/MoveOn.org/Howard Dean left-wing of the Democratic Party, which wants to pull out of Iraq quickly and almost never wants to use force to protect America’s interests.
Both Beinart and Marshall want Democrats to return to the “Cold War liberalism” or “muscular progressivism” pursued by presidents such as Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman and John Kennedy.
One realist, Steve Clemons of the New America Foundation, says it’s not clear that Bush has truly changed foreign policies, suggesting instead that his mind is “out for bid” and that neo-cons might yet convince him to bomb Iran before the end of his second term.
Nuclear weapons in the possession of a fanatic like Ahmadinejad would destabilize the Middle East. A U.S. or Israeli military strike on Iran would, too. So diplomacy is clearly the preferred option. All theories aside, we need to hope that Rice carries the day.
Morton Kondracke is executive editor of Roll Call, the newspaper of Capitol Hill.