Conservative Advocate: And now, North Korea
When President Bush took office in January 2001, three relatively small but unambiguously hostile nations were actively seeking to become nuclear powers: North Korea, Iraq and Iran. In the wake of Sept. 11, Bush called this problem to the attention of the nation and the world, forthrightly labeling them an “axis of evil.”
Of the three, North Korea posed the most imminent danger, thanks to the disastrous mishandling of that problem by President Clinton. When it became clear in 1993 that North Korea was on the verge of producing a nuclear weapon (and indeed might already have produced at least one), Clinton sent Jimmy Carter to Pyongyang to negotiate a settlement. In return for North Korea’s promise to halt its nuclear program, the so-called Agreed Framework of 1994 pledged to provide both food and fuel to North Korea. Unfortunately, no inspection procedures to enforce this agreement were insisted upon.
By 1998, it was clear that North Korea had simply shifted from one method of making a nuclear bomb (plutonium processing) to another (uranium enrichment) and was thus violating the agreement. If Clinton had really wanted to resolve an international crisis to add luster to his legacy, here was his chance.
Utilizing the momentum afforded by the American people’s response to Sept. 11, Bush moved to confront the danger. Wisely, he chose to force the issue with Iraq first, since Saddam Hussein was believed nearer to acquiring nuclear capability than Iran — to becoming, in other words, another North Korea. In just three and a half weeks, he ended Saddam’s ambition forever.
Right in the middle of the crisis over Iraq, North Korea’s Kim Jong Il sought to blackmail the United States with a series of bloodcurdling threats, which have continued off and on ever since. To their credit, President Bush and Secretary of State Powell refused to panic — declining even to describe the North Korean situation as a “crisis.” But with Iraq cleansed of Saddam Hussein, we can be sure that their attention is refocusing — laser-like — on North Korea.
The best guess is North Korea probably still possesses those one or two nuclear bombs, plus missiles capable of reaching South Korea and Japan, and the ability to make a bomb per month, thanks to Clinton. On Wednesdays and Saturdays, Kim Jong Il asserts that he is actually producing more bombs and intends to use or sell them; on Thursdays and Sundays, his government calls these statements mistranslations from the Korean.
The solution is plain enough. In the words of The New York Times, “The goal of negotiations should be nothing less than getting the North to give up its nuclear ambitions, rejoin the nonproliferation treaty and allow intrusive inspections. … (In return) Washington is willing to consider security guarantees, diplomatic recognition and economic aid.”
But what if Kim Jong Il refuses? His one or two bombs have never been tested, but we must assume they might be able to vaporize Seoul or Tokyo. And short of that, he has an army of a million men along his country’s border with South Korea, within 25 miles of Seoul. What it would take to eliminate those bombs, and incapacitate that army, are grim questions indeed, with even grimmer answers. But if Kim insists, this country will have no choice.
(William Rusher is a Distinguished Fellow of the Claremont Institute for the Study of Statesmanship and Political Philosophy.)